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ISMAIL RÀJÁ AL-FÀRÂQÁ AND HIS THEORY OF META RELIGION AS A NEW APPROACH IN COMPARATIVE RELIGION
by Dr Haslina Ibrahim [View Writer's Profile]
Abstract
This paper seeks to examine al-Faruqi's meta-religion principles as a universal and unbiased standard of judgment in the study of religions. Accordingly, al-Faruqi criticized the phenomenological method for it propagates epoche (suspension of judgment) as a permanent element in the study of religions and therefore is exposed to skepticism and relativism. This according to al-Faruqi will sacrifice the aim of studying religions, which is to comprehend the Truth. Meta-religion in celebrating such aim, far from dogmatic, is rationalistic. Moreover, once the Truth is ascertained, it is not to be imposed on man for meta-religion upholds the idea of freedom of religion.
Introduction
Isma?ál Rajá al-Farâqá was among the Muslim scholars
who engaged enthusiastically and actively in inter-religious affairs. He was once
a vice-president of the Inter-religious Peace Colloquium in which he had significantly
participated in the world religious dialogue. Another major contribution by al-Farâqá
is developing in the field of studies of religion. His masterpiece in this field
is Christian Ethics, published in 1967, which indeed epitomizes a new break-through
in the study of religion, especially in terms of Muslim scholarship of other religions.
The most provocative principles he expounded in Christian Ethics was the idea
of Meta-Religion as a prolegomena in the comparative study of religion.
Before going further into al-Farâqá's Meta-Religion principles
and relating them to his pluralist account of religion, it is important to highlight
beforehand his disapproval of the prevailing Western methodology in the study
of religion. The critique he made on this matter is discussed in the introductionary
chapter of Christian Ethics and profoundly discussed in one of his articles
entitled Meta-Religion: Towards A Critical World Theology. In al-Farâqá's
view, the study of religion, as propagated under the Western scheme has failed
either to provide an objective study of religions or even to comprehend correctly
the existence of plural religions. Al-Farâqá's main criticism,
however, is laid upon the concept of bracketing or suspension of judgment which
is coined by the phenomenological study of religion.
i. Constructive criticism to the phenomenological method
Being objective, al-Farâqá acknowledged the positive aspect of
the phenomenology of religion, especially in substituting the theological and
philosophical method in the study of religions. Al-Farâqá's discontentment
with the theological method lies in the fact that it advocates an exclusive
outlook, propagating Christianity as the only true religion, the only criterion
and the norm of religious truth, and hence the judge of all other religions.
The philosophical method, on the other hand, projected a more skeptical outlook
to religious truth to the extent that it is critical of all the claims that
religion made. Phenomenology of religion, in trying to avoid both shortcomings,
prescribed an epoche or suspension of judgment in the study of religion. The
main reason for epoche is to avoid prejudgment and to study religion as it is,
in order to comprehending a real eidetic vision of religion. The aim is indeed
noble, but the methodology that the phenomenologicalist adopted did not escape
al-Farâqá's criticism. Al-Farâqá is of the view that
knowledge presupposes judgment. He believed that knowledge is not only the collection
and systematization of data, but most importantly, knowledge consists in valuing
the data. In this respect, though suspension of judgment is needed in understanding
certain religions, the suspension could not be permanent. Should knowledge on
the studied religion be meaningful, some evaluative principles need to be applied.
Yet, the evaluative principles must again be freed from any kind of prejudgment
and be universally applicable.
Propagating the idea that suspension of judgment should not be permanent, al-Farâqá
suggested his formula to the student of a religion, that the latter must be
able to move freely and continually between the three realms of determination:
those of his own religion-culture, of the religio-culture under study and of
universal rationality. The third realm of determination, which is universal
rationality, is the realm in which the principles of Meta-Religion is to be
used as a measuring standard in the study of religions.
Al-Farâqá is of the belief that such a standard of judgment is
important because knowledge presupposes judgment. Hence, man's knowledge of
a religion presupposes some application of evaluative principle. Meta-Religion,
in providing such a standard of judgment, consists of a few general principles
which serve as a basis for comparison. Indeed such a standard of judgment is
the shortcoming in the Western methodology for the studies of religion, be it
anthropological, sociological, psychological, historical, philosophical, theological
or even phenomenological. Above all, al-Farâqá advocated that Meta-Religion
helps to make sense out of the infinite diversity of the religious-cultural
experiences and to satisfy the intellectual curiosity for the truth. In this
manner, the studies of religion shall not be merely a collection and systematization
of data on religions but will also establish the critical dimension towards
the religions.
ii. Meta-Religion principles
The Meta-Religion is an institution consisting of the following six universal
principles extensively discussed in al-Farâqá's Christian Ethics:
i) Being is of two realms: Ideal and Actual
ii) Ideal Being is relevant to actual being
iii) Relevance of the Ideal to the actual is a command
iv) Actual being is as such good
v) Actual being is malleable
vi) Perfection of the cosmos is only a human burden
The universality of the six principles is very much determined by the first
principle which imposed the idea of the duality of nature. In this very first
principle, al-Farâqá, using the methodology of the philosophers,
attempted to lay the firm foundation in his arguments of duality to juxtapose
the idea that there are two 'beings' by the names of 'Ideal Being' and 'actual
being'. Applying the first principle from the perspective of religion, the duality
of nature is presented in terms of, the 'Ideal Being' as the Creator (God) and
'the actual being' is the creation. Any religion will meet this very first principle,
(that is, the existence of the Creator that every religion reveres) in the sense
that the moment it invalidates this first principle, the whole religion and
its discourses will be invalid too. Indeed, the strength and the beauty of Meta-Religion
depended upon this very first principle, for it predetermines the eligibility
of that religion to be analyzed by the following five principles. Should the
religion, conform to the first principle, it proceeds to the following principles.
In the case that at any stage the religion fails to meet the principle, it signifies
the shaky ground of that religion. Indeed, this is the evaluating aspect proposed
by al-Farâqá in the study of religion. Such a finding (after the
evaluation process) is the truth that determine the validity of that religion,
and the Truth that values the knowledge of that religion.
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